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Abstract 
The neutral theory of biodiversity assumes that coexisting organisms are equally able to 
survive, reproduce and disperse (ecological equivalence), but predicts that stochastic 
fluctuations of these abilities drive diversity dynamics. It predicts remarkably well many 
biodiversity patterns, although substantial evidence for the role of niche variation across 
organisms seems contradictory. Here, we discuss this apparent paradox by exploring the 
meaning and implications of ecological equivalence. 
We address the question whether neutral theory provides an explanation for biodiversity 
patterns and acknowledges causal processes. We underline that ecological equivalence, 
although central to neutral theory, can emerge at local and regional scales from niche-based 
processes through equalizing and stabilizing mechanisms. Such emerging equivalence 
corresponds to a weak conception of neutral theory, as opposed to the assumption of strict 
equivalence at individual level in the strong conception. We show that this duality is related 
to diverging views on hypothesis-testing and modeling in ecology. In addition, the stochastic 
dynamics exposed in neutral theory are pervasive in ecological systems and, rather than a null 
hypothesis, ecological equivalence is best understood as a parsimonious baseline to address 
biodiversity dynamics at multiple scales. 	
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Introduction	
Since the publication of the Unified Neutral Theory of Biodiversity and Biogeography 
(UNTB, Hubbell, 2001), the neutral theory has been very influential but also very 
controversial in ecology. Across the numerous models that have been elaborated, neutral 
theory focuses on stochastic variations in individual birth and death rates to predict long term 
trends in the composition of communities. Furthermore, the basic concepts of this theory are 
closely related to the neutral theory of molecular evolution, which has also been influential 
and controversial among evolutionary biologists from the 1960s (Kimura, 1984). At the heart 
of both approaches is the fundamental equivalence assumption that biological variation 
among organisms does not reflect any difference in their ability to survive, reproduce and 
disperse (Bell, 2001). Species coexistence is then a dynamical equilibrium driven by the 
stochastic variations in speciation and extinction at regional scale, and in basic life, death and 
dispersal dynamics at local scale (called "neutral dynamics"). The equivalence assumption is 
traditionally opposed to an exclusive explanatory role of niche variation and competitive 
exclusion in ecology (Whitfield, 2002), and to the correlated idea of natural selection in 
evolution (Mikkelson, 2005). 
The neutral theory has shown a remarkably good heuristic value to predict patterns of 
species abundance distributions (SAD) in a number of ecosystems (Bell, 2001; Chave, 2004; 
Hubbell, 1997; Hubbell, 2001). Encouraged by this apparent robustness, many studies have 
applied neutral models to analyze community dynamics in a variety of ecosystems (Chave et 
al., 2006; Latimer et al., 2005; Volkov et al., 2003). At the same time, variation in survival 
and reproductive abilities is often observed in real communities and apparently violates the 
equivalence assumption (Purves and Turnbull, 2010). The fact that the theory works well in 
terms of resulting species-abundance patterns despite the violation of its basic assumption is 
an apparent paradox (Gewin, 2006). A decade and half after the work of Hubbell (2001), 
debates and disagreement persist on whether neutral theory provides explanation for observed 
species diversity patterns, and on how to test its expectations. Our primary objective here is 
to clarify the explanatory nature of the theory. 
The basic idea of neutral theory is that numerous and repeated “microscopic” individual 
stochastic variations result, over space and time, in specific patterns of species relative 
abundances. Central to the debate on neutral theory is the divergence between "weak" and 
"strong" interpretations of the theory (Bell, 2001). The "strong" interpretation considers that 
neutral theory is refuted if strict fitness equivalence is not met at the individual level. 
Conversely, in the “weak” interpretation, variation in individual fitness can be 
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counterbalanced and neutral patterns of biodiversity can emerge without strict individual 
equivalence. In this case, the fact that an observed pattern does not reflect the influence of 
biological differences does not mean that individual dynamics are actually neutral, but it 
indicates that the observed pattern does not convey a signature of non-neutral processes. In 
this regard, the strong interpretation emphasizes basic neutral dynamics at individual level, 
while the weak interpretation emphasizes the emergence of neutral patterns.  
Here, we analyze the mechanistic understanding of neutral dynamics in the dual 
interpretations of neutral theory, and show that the issue more broadly relates to what 
explanation, causality and hypothesis testing mean in community ecology. In this regard, 
even a decade and a half after Hubbell's book, some basic questions are still hard to answer: 
Does neutral theory provide an explanation for real community dynamics? If so, is this 
explanation causal? Is the neutral theory a null hypothesis against which to analyze observed 
patterns? Are there instead signatures of both neutral and non-neutral processes in the 
composition of ecological communities? The nature of explanation is clearly a central issue, 
since answers to the above questions may rely on what we mean by “signatures” (from a 
pattern-oriented point of view) and “causal explanation” (from a process-oriented point of 
view). A basic aim of the paper is then to delineate more clearly the nature of ecological 
equivalence, central to the neutral theory, so as to better assess the status of causation within 
the theory. We will show that the weak and strong interpretations of neutral theory imply 
different conceptions of ecological equivalence, which entail a profound epistemic divide. 
We will emphasize that ecological equivalence can be found at multiple scales under the 
influence of both neutral and non-neutral dynamics and, therefore, that ecological 
equivalence can be part of a comprehensive theory of biodiversity dynamics. 
The paper will first address the nature of neutral dynamics, and whether the neutral 
theory can provide a mechanistic framework for biodiversity dynamics and species 
coexistence. We will especially focus on the relationship between neutral processes and 
neutral patterns. The second step will question the nature and status of ecological equivalence 
in terms of equalizing and stabilizing mechanisms, and how it should be used to investigate 
biodiversity dynamics from local communities to a regional set of species. We will discuss 
the philosophical nature of the dualism in neutral and non-neutral views, and highlight that 
spatial and temporal scales are critical aspects of the link between emerging patterns of 
ecological equivalence and possibly non-neutral underlying processes. We will then 
distinguish several levels at which mechanisms can be appealed to when one analyzes 
biodiversity patterns, and reconsider the notion of null hypothesis against which to test the 
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role of niche differences. Actually, a major gap exists currently in ecology between (i) 
hypothetico-deductive approaches where neutral “random” models represent null hypotheses 
that should be falsified in favor of alternative models representing the contribution of niche 
differences, and (ii) integrative approaches that recognize a genuine role for neutral dynamics 
and intend to characterize their contribution to community dynamics, possibly in combination 
with other niche-based processes. The fourth section will distinguish these perspectives and 
show that they pertain to different conceptions of hypothesis testing. From this analysis, we 
will show that the traditional dichotomy of neutral and niche-based biodiversity dynamics 
should be abandoned, and be replaced by a more comprehensive theory of ecological 
equivalence. When analyzing biodiversity dynamics in terms of ecological equivalence, the 
focus is no longer on the immediate and local effects of biological differences, but rather on 
the level and scale at which these differences matter to explain biodiversity patterns. Figure 1 
summarizes the overall logic and organization of the paper. Table 1 provides a glossary of the 
basic concepts of the paper. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual diagram of the present paper, with emphasis on the central ecological 
equivalence assumption. The left part shows the basic motivations of the neutral theory, which 
translates in the middle part into a framework of ecological equivalence and biodiversity dynamics at 
local and regional scales. The right part introduces the main epistemic aspects that are discussed in the 
paper, with numbering of the corresponding sections.  
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Table 1. Glossary of the key concepts 
 
Term 
 
Definition 
 
Neutral biodiversity pattern 
 
A biodiversity pattern classically summarizes variation in species 
number and relative abundances, within and between 
communities. A neutral biodiversity pattern represents an 
equilibrium state resulting from neutral dynamics. 
 
Neutral dynamics A combination of immigration, speciation and ecological drift 
driving community and metacommunity composition over time, 
based on an assumption of ecological equivalence.  
 
  
Neutral model Mechanistic model of individual life, death, reproduction and 
dispersal events, under the assumption of per capita fitness 
equivalence. These basic stochastic events collectively yield 
neutral dynamics. 
 
 
Strict ecological equivalence 
 
All the individuals have identical prospect of living, dying, 
reproducing and dispersing, which implies that they have equal 
fitnesses. They can display distinct ecological properties, but 
equalizing mechanisms then yield fitness equality (Figure 2a). 
 
Emerging ecological 
equivalence 
 
 
All the populations of coexisting taxa show positive growth rates 
from low density, meaning that there is no better competitor. Strict 
equivalence implies emerging equivalence, but not the reverse. 
Non-equal individual fitness can be counterbalanced by stabilizing 
mechanisms yielding emerging equivalence (Figures 2b and 2c). 
 
  
7	
1. An explanatory theory of unspecified individual interactions 
To understand the role of the neutral theory in ecology, one should first focus on the kind 
of explanation it provides for biodiversity. In neutral communities, species abundances 
change with time according to stochastic birth, death and dispersal events, plus speciation 
events in a large-scale biogeographical metacommunity (Hubbell, 2001). This framework is 
analogous to the neutral theory of population genetics, where species abundance is replaced 
by allele frequency and speciation by mutation (Kimura, 1984). In finite communities, 
stochastic fluctuations of species abundances (so-called ecological drift, analogous to random 
genetic drift in population genetics) lead to random extinctions. Without any influx of 
migrants, a local community will undergo species loss until only one species survives 
(fixation). Likewise, at the regional scale, the metacommunity will lose species until fixation, 
unless new species are created by speciation. Although the stochastic variation in speciation, 
migration and local birth-death dynamics yields an unpredictable community composition at 
any given time, statistical patterns such as species abundance distributions (SAD) can be 
predicted at equilibrium depending on the balance between speciation, migration and drift. In 
the model of Hubbell (2001) with point speciation in the metacommunity, the regional 
balance of speciation and drift leads to an equilibrium mean number of species (Ewens, 1972) 
and to a log-series species abundance distribution. In addition, the relative abundances in a 
local community depend on the balance of local drift and immigration from this 
metacommunity. Alternative models have considered different speciation and migration 
processes, and thus predicted varying biodiversity patterns (e.g., Chave and Leigh, 2002; 
Rosindell et al., 2010). Apart from these variations, any neutral model assumes that there is 
no influence of biological differences between species on individual dynamics. 
Conversely, a niche-based theory of species coexistence (in short, “niche theory”) claims 
that species can coexist or not depending on their niche properties and on specific ecological 
interactions such as competition, mutualism, etc. Therefore, while niche theory is a theory of 
specified interactions and determinate processes, neutral theory is a theory of unspecified 
interactions and stochastic dynamics. In the context of population genetics, natural selection 
is analogous to niche-based processes as a theory of specified interactions between 
individuals having distinct genotypes. Even though neutral dynamics yield specific species 
abundance distributions (SAD), it may still be misleading to refer to them as neutral 
processes, in the sense that a process is classically defined as a determinate, i.e., specific, 
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cause of some outcomes, which is often characterized in terms of the typicality of some 
interactions (Dowe, 2009; Ellis, 1999). 
Given that a central motivation of neutral models has been to suggest new explanations 
of biodiversity patterns, let us now consider the explanatory difference between competing 
neutral and niche theories. Within the philosophical literature on explanation, explaining can 
be seen as either providing unifying schemes (Friedman, 1974; Kitcher, 1976), or 
characterizing causal relations (Salmon, 1984). These views are not necessarily exclusive 
(e.g. Strevens, 2004 for a conciliation), but in ecology a primary objective is to find 
“mechanistic explanations” to observed patterns, which is a causalist conception of 
explanation (McGill and Nekola, 2010). This conception is indeed central to niche-based 
coexistence theory, where mechanisms of resource use and interactions at the individual 
level, depending on niche differences, determine whether species can coexist or not 
(MacArthur and Levins, 1967). The word “cause” here purports to a view of a “difference 
maker” (Hall, 2004; Lewis, 1973; Menzies, 2004; Waters, 2007; Woodward, 2003), namely, 
a cause is a difference (e.g., changing the value of an input variable) that makes a difference 
(e.g., changing the value of an output variable). In the case of niche-based species 
coexistence, the difference in ecological characteristics between two species makes a 
difference in resulting species relative abundances. A species is expected to become more 
abundant than other species in a local community if it displays some attributes conferring 
better abilities for survival and reproduction in the local environment (Shipley et al., 2006). 
The niche theory then provides an explanation based on determinate causal processes at the 
individual level (e.g. competition, predation or mutualism). In population genetics, to be 
selected likewise means to be there because of a difference in individual fitness due to some 
genotypic attributes (Abrams, 2007; Brandon and Ramsey, 2007; Dietrich and Millstein, 
2008; Sober, 1993). Therefore, in niche theory, the difference – between species, alleles or 
genotypes – makes a difference upon the identity of species, alleles, or genotypes present at 
equilibrium, so that it provides causal relations in the sense of difference-making.  
Conversely, neutral dynamics are not causal in the same sense as niche-based processes 
are. Even though the relative species abundance distributions can be determined by a given 
set of neutral parameters, such as the fundamental biodiversity number of Hubbell (2001), the 
species composition is variable and changes from a replicate neutral community to another. If 
species A realizes the peak of the abundance distribution, by definition no biological property 
of A is a reason for its dominance in a neutral community; which means that, if we design a 
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replicate community and consider the resulting biodiversity pattern under the assumption of 
ecological equivalence, we will get a similar relative abundance distribution without A 
necessarily being a dominant species. The explanatory target of the neutral theory concerns 
the relative species abundance and resulting diversity patterns at local and regional scales. It 
explains these patterns in the sense that it provides a way to generate them while minimizing 
the appeal to the influence of numerous biological properties. 
As a consequence, neutral and niche theories cannot be considered two rival hypotheses 
that would stand on the same level, because their explanatory targets are partially different. A 
major reason for the success of neutral theory in community ecology is that it predicts 
realistic patterns of biodiversity, expressed via distributions of species abundances that were 
debated in macroecology for a long time, such as the log-series distribution (Bell, 2001; 
Fisher et al., 1943; Preston, 1948). This quest for general laws has long been centered on 
species diversity patterns (essentially SAD), which do not integrate the nature of species 
biological differences. A basic requisite of neutral theory is that these patterns should be 
independent of species properties. However if a niche model predicts a species diversity 
pattern, it may also explain why some species are more represented than others based on 
some biological properties (Grime, 1998; Shipley et al., 2006). Therefore, other patterns of 
diversity based on species properties should help detect the alternative effect of niche-based 
processes. Trait-based perspectives to community ecology (McGill et al., 2006b) and 
ecophylogenetics (Mouquet et al., 2012) have conveyed novel tests of niche-based processes 
by analyzing the diversity of species traits instead of relying solely on species taxonomy and 
abundances. Although the neutral theory does not say where a specific species stands in the 
abundance distribution, this question could be answered by niche theory, since niche 
properties then explain the success of a specific species in a specific environment (Chase, 
2005). We will keep this clarification in mind while turning in a second step to a specification 
of what the ecological equivalence assumption can integrate. 
2. The origin(s) of ecological equivalence 
The neutral theory explains and predicts biodiversity patterns at community and/or 
regional scales, based on the assumption of ecological equivalence, also termed neutrality 
assumption. Basic per capita ecological equivalence is defined in a very broad sense by 
Hubbell (2001:6): “I use neutral to describe the assumption of per capita ecological 
equivalence of all individuals of all species in a trophically defined community. This is a very 
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unrestrictive and permissive definition of neutrality because it does not preclude interesting 
biology from happening or complex ecological interactions from taking place among 
individuals.” The fuzzy limits clearly reflect the fact that the assumption represents some 
effective ecological equivalence. In the following, we will address how ecological 
equivalence so broadly defined can be reached in different ways, thus entailing different 
conceptions of neutrality. Quite independently of the neutralist perspective, Chesson (2000) 
proposed a general conceptual framework of diversity maintenance in ecological 
communities, linking individual fitness and niche properties to community-level patterns of 
coexistence. We will use here this framework to explore and discuss the meaning of 
ecological equivalence. It is based on the long-term per capita population growth rate of a 
putative invader i, denoted as , which initially occurs at low density in a local community. 
Invasibility here represents the ability of a species to increase from low abundance in the 
presence of the resident species of the community. If there is resource limitation in a system 
with a resident s and an invader i, the per-capita population growth rate of i is 
, where the µs represent the mean per capita growth rates of species i and s 
in the absence of resource limitation, and the bs are the rate at which these per capita growth 
rates decrease as resources decrease (Chesson, 2000; Chesson and Huntly, 1997). k. = µ./b. (. 
= i or s) is then a measure of the relative average fitness of species at population level, such 
that a species with the largest k will be the winning competitor. This basic model cannot lead 
to stable coexistence, as  will be positive for one species only. 
Conversely, in a context of niche partitioning between coexisting species, the per capita 
population growth rate of i can be written as , where ρ is a 
parameter of niche overlap of the two species, that is, the proportion of resources they both 
use. With ρ < 1 (niches do not completely overlap), the growth rates can be positive for both 
species i and s, and competitive exclusion by a top competitor can be avoided. The model can 
be generalized to multispecies assemblage, such as  
,   (1) 
where n is the number of species,  is the average fitness of resident species, and D is a 
positive constant. Coexistence will be possible for a set of species i when their  values are 
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positive, and long-term coexistence will occur if the  values are close to 0. This is a form of 
ecological equivalence expressed at the level of population dynamics, which differs from 
Hubbell’s (2001) primary assumption of fitness equivalence of individuals. This population-
level equivalence can be achieved either by (i) reducing the magnitude of per capita fitness 
differences between species in the left term of Eq. (1) (equalization, Figure 2a) or (ii) if 
processes overcome these differences in the second stabilizing term of Eq. (1) (stabilization, 
Figures 2b and 2c) (Adler et al., 2007). We will consider this formalism to explore the limits 
of the basic fitness equivalence assumption in the neutral theory (extent of equalizing 
mechanisms), and the robustness of its predictions when fitness equivalence is violated 
(extent of stabilizing mechanisms). 
2.1 Equalizing mechanisms 
Ecological equivalence has been captured by the concept of fitness invariance in the 
framework of Hubbell (2001:322): “By fitness invariance I mean that there are different 
trade-off combinations of life-history traits that confer equivalent per capita relative fitnesses 
on the species exhibiting them.” Even when ecological variation exists among individuals 
and species, the assumption holds whenever the lifetime survival and fecundity probabilities 
are invariant in mathematical expectation among individuals. Averaging out these differences 
amounts to equalizing fitness. Therefore, equivalence can stem from aggregated intrinsically 
non-neutral differences between organisms (Doncaster, 2009; Hubbell, 2006). Under 
Hubbell's definition of fitness invariance, the right term of equation (1) is equal to 0 (no 
stabilization), and the left term must be kept close to 0 to allow long-term species 
coexistence. The model then provides an instance of neutral dynamics. As Adler et al. 
(2007:96) noticed, “neutral models are simply the special case where species have equivalent 
fitnesses and there are no stabilizing niche-based processes”. The theory is thus robust to trait 
variation among species regarding some aspects of their biology, as far as they result in 
similar levels of fitness (Figure 2a). 
ir
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Figure 2. Patterns and spatial scales of ecological equivalence. The ellipses represent local communities 
including a set of individuals (circles). The motif and the color of the circles represent fitness variations between 
individuals. The three figures exemplify situations where ecological equivalence is expected at local and/or at regional 
scale. The curves represent some putative species abundance distributions at local and regional scales, in which 
species abundances depend on their niche properties (dashed line) or not (plain line). The Figures then basically 
stresses when and how species abundances are not influenced by niche differences at local and regional scale. In the 
strong interpretation of neutral theory (a), effective fitness equivalence of individuals within communities leads to 
niche-independent dynamics. Variation in ecological characteristics among species is possible, insofar as they level 
out and yield equivalent fitness. In a broader perspective of emerging ecological equivalence, as understood in the 
weak interpretation of neutral theory, there is no effect of biological differences on species population dynamics 
thanks to stabilizing mechanisms. In the case of local stabilizing mechanisms (b), fitness differences are 
counterbalanced by mechanisms such as negative frequency dependence within communities, which prevent the most 
competitive species to dominate. In the case of regional stabilizing mechanisms (c), fitness differences within local 
communities are counterbalanced by the dynamics between communities as, e.g., when there is a competition-
colonization trade-off. Stabilization allows local and regional ecological equivalence despite actual fitness differences 
between individuals (variation of motif and color of individuals).  
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2.2 Stabilizing mechanisms 
Conversely, several studies showed that patterns of community diversity quite similar to 
those predicted by the neutral theory can be found even when fitness is uneven across species 
(Allouche and Kadmon, 2009; Chave et al., 2002; Doncaster, 2009). In these cases, the 
fitness difference in the left term of equation (1) is no longer equal to 0 and the model does 
not conform to the equivalence assumption as defined by Hubbell (2001). However, the 
stabilizing term of equation (1) can still be large enough to overcome the effect of fitness 
differences. Specifically, the stabilizing term can be increased by niche differences between 
species, which allows species coexistence in communities at equilibrium (MacArthur and 
Levins, 1967). In particular, niche differences between species make competition stronger 
within species than between species, so that the growth rate ri can decrease when population 
density of species i increases (negative density-dependence). Negative density dependence 
can, therefore, prevent competitive exclusion by maintaining the coexisting species at low 
density (Levine and HilleRisLambers, 2009). Another factor contributing to the stabilizing 
term is differences in colonization abilities (Mouquet and Loreau, 2003, Figure 2c). In this 
case, a less competitive species can survive in a community because more competitive 
species display lower colonizing ability, so that they cannot establish everywhere and occupy 
all the communities at the same time (Hubbell, 1979; Tilman, 1994). Coexistence of many 
species is thus possible within communities despite a competitive hierarchy (Mouquet and 
Loreau, 2003). Here stabilization occurs in the overall set of communities connected by 
migration (the metacommunity), and can maintain species equivalence in the local 
community despite the asymmetry in species fitness. 
2.3 Emergence of ecological equivalence 
Therefore, a per capita ecological equivalence can be reached via two ways in Chesson’s 
framework. Doncaster (2009) introduced the concept of “realized fitness” to stress that 
“species must achieve ecological equivalence at their coexistence equilibrium, which is 
defined by equal realized fitness for all.” Therefore, various mechanisms can make the global 
state of a community close to ecological equivalence through the stabilization and 
equalization terms of Equation (1). The role of equalization and stabilization is central to the 
distinction between the "weak" and "strong" interpretations of neutral theory. The strong 
interpretation is a mechanistic view of the neutral theory, where the fitness equivalence must 
actually be met at the individual level, with or without the influence of equalizing 
mechanisms. In this case, equivalence is explanatory of the processes that yield the 
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biodiversity patterns. Conversely, “the weak version recognizes that the neutral theory is 
capable of generating patterns that resemble those arising from survey data, without 
acknowledging that it correctly identifies the underlying mechanism responsible for 
generating these patterns” (Bell 2001). Therefore, ecological equivalence entails neutral 
dynamics in the strong interpretation, while it is a consequence of neutral and possibly non-
neutral dynamics in the weak interpretation of the theory. Here stabilization can 
counterbalance the influence of fitness differences and generate patterns of relative 
abundances close to that of neutral models (Allouche and Kadmon, 2009; Chave et al., 2002; 
Doncaster, 2009). In this case, the pattern is considered to be neutral in the weak 
interpretation, but the dynamics are non-neutral in the sense of the strong interpretation. It 
entails that a basic neutral model of speciation, migration and drift does not necessarily 
represent actual dynamics in the weak interpretation.  
 A central role in the weak interpretation is granted to dispersal limitation, which can act 
as both an equalizing and a stabilizing factor (Holyoak and Loreau, 2006: 1273). It is 
equalizing because dispersal limitation limits the number of competitors coexisting at a given 
time and hence the extent of effective fitness differences (Hurtt and Pacala, 1995). It is 
stabilizing because locally dispersed propagules tend to generate spatial clustering of 
populations, which increases intraspecific competition compared to interspecific competition. 
In addition, dispersal couples local and regional species dynamics and requires moving from 
the individual-level conception of equivalence to a larger-scale emerging conception, as 
understood in the weak interpretation. Acknowledging the pervasive effect of dispersal 
limitation in ecological communities is, therefore, a key to understanding the relevance of 
ecological equivalence when explaining patterns of biodiversity from local to regional scale. 
In this context we can specify the reason why the term process does not mean the same 
thing in neutral and niche-based models. On the one hand, niche-based models address the 
determinate effect of elementary ecological processes based on specific, individual-level 
biological differences. These differences constitute the basic ecological non-equivalence. On 
the other hand, neutral theory represents stochastic biodiversity dynamics based on some 
species ecological equivalence, but it does not preclude a role of niche-based differences in 
yielding this ecological equivalence. Ecological equivalence can itself be the result of 
different processes – here, based on equalizing and stabilizing mechanisms. Therefore, when 
one actually wants to talk of “neutral processes”, there is an equivocation: “the neutral 
processes” either mean a set of equalizing and stabilizing mechanisms yielding ecological 
equivalence, or the dynamics occurring under the condition of ecological equivalence. With 
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respect to this equivocation, Doncaster (2009) wrote that “neutral patterns need not imply 
neutral processes”. 
Thus we have used the Chesson's framework to address the nature of ecological 
equivalence from individual to population level.  Because individual niche differences can 
play a role in stabilization, the way ecological equivalence is reached in this framework do 
not necessarily conform to the patterns predicted by neutral models considering strict 
equivalence at individual level. But whatever is the mathematical nature of the pattern, any 
ecological equivalence emerging from equilization and stabilization prevents a determinate 
influence of niche differences on the species relative abundances. In this regard, it basically 
emphasizes the role of unspecified interactions and stochastic dynamics, which conforms to 
the nature of neutral theory (§1). The focus on emerging ecological equivalence thus allows 
extending the scope of original neutral models while retaining their epistemic specificify. 
Given that the processes considered at the source of ecological equivalence may not occur at 
the same scale, this leaves open the issue of the scale at which ecological equivalence can 
occur, a question that we now address. 
3. What is the scale of ecological equivalence? 
In order to clarify at which spatial and temporal scale ecological equivalence can occur, 
one needs to characterize the role of species ecological attributes for their persistence at 
nested spatial scales. A traditional top-down scheme of niche-based processes represents 
successive ecological filters determining how individuals from a regional source may 
establish and survive in a local community (Cornwell and Ackerly, 2009; Lortie et al., 2004, 
Figure 3 left). However, such top-down approach to niche-based processes is challenged by 
the idea of ecological equivalence, which can emerge from stabilizing and equalizing 
processes operating at a finer spatial scale (Figure 3 right). In addition, Chesson (2000) 
highlighted that the balance of equalizing and stabilizing mechanisms can change according 
to the spatial and temporal scale. Therefore, Holyoak and Loreau (2006) stressed that 
“ecological equivalence (…) occurs because species that have spatial or temporal niche 
partitioning become equivalent in their competitive abilities at some spatial or temporal 
scale”. Several hypotheses exist regarding the scales at which equalizing and stabilizing 
mechanisms can yield ecological equivalence: 
 Local-scale equalization (Figure 2a). Hubbell (2001) and Leibold and McPeek (2006) 
proposed that local guilds of functionally equivalent species are included in a matrix of 
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heterogeneous habitats inhabited by other guilds (see also Leibold, 2008). In this case, niche 
variation can exist between individuals of distinct communities, while the individuals within 
local communities are ecologically equivalent (Walker, 2007). The ancient concept of 
ecological guild and the modern notion of functional group represent such hierarchy of 
ecologically similar organisms embedded in dissimilar groups (Wilson, 1999). A point of 
reference for this theory is the guilds of canopy tree species in wet evergreen tropical forests: 
many species, often more than 100 species in a 1ha patch of forest, appear to be functionally 
equivalent and to display a neutral pattern of relative species abundances at very local scale. 
The spatial extent of habitats occupied by guilds varies according to the nature and function 
of organisms (e.g., coral reef communities, mycorrhizal networks in soil, etc.). In this regard, 
ecological equivalence is restricted to a homogenous environmental context where coexisting 
species display similar prospects of living, reproducing and dispersing, while environmental 
variation selects different compositions in separate communities. Dispersal limitation 
contributes to local equalization by limiting the probability that many competitors are found 
in the community at the same time (Hurtt and Pacala, 1995). In an	evolutionary perspective, 
the interplay of neutral and niche-based dynamics can yield the emergence of distinct guilds 
along environmental gradients (Scheffer and van Nes, 2006; Vergnon et al., 2009).  
 Local-scale stabilization (Figure 2b). Local stabilizing mechanisms can prevent 
competitive dominance and maintain species-rich local communities. This is the core idea of 
the negative density dependence model, which predicts that the competitive advantage of a 
species decreases as its density increases, because it is penalized by stronger intraspecific 
competition.The underlying mechanism may be related to limited resources (Levine and 
HilleRisLambers, 2009), including limited pollinator availability (Chesson and Warner, 1981; 
Gigord et al., 2001), or to species-specific parasites or predators (Hatcher et al., 2006; 
Johnson et al., 2012; Louda et al., 1990). As mentioned above, dispersal limitation also 
contributes to negative density dependence and local stabilization, because clusters of 
individuals of the same species are formed close to the parents and increase intraspecific 
competition (Holyoak and Loreau, 2006: 1273). 
 Large-scale stabilization (Figure 2c). Much research in ecology still emphasizes that 
variation in local performance relates to niche differences between coexisting species (Grime, 
1998; Shipley et al., 2006). In situations where such non-neutral processes dominate locally, 
niche variation across species can still average out across communities dispatched in 
heterogeneous habitats, leading to a larger-scale pattern of ecological equivalence (Lavin et 
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al., 2004; Muneepeerakul et al., 2008; Pueyo, 2006). Dispersal limitation acts as a mechanism 
of large-scale stabilization by avoiding the predominance of better competitors or better 
colonizers across communities (Mouquet and Loreau, 2003). This form of stabilization can 
create neutral patterns of biodiversity at the regional scale, but not locally.   
 
Therefore, addressing niche-based and neutral dynamics is fundamentally contingent 
upon the spatial and temporal scales of interest (Chase, 2014; Garzon-Lopez et al., 2013). A 
critical issue here is to characterize ecological objects at a level (e.g., by delineating guilds) 
and a scale (local or regional), which comply or not with an equivalence assumption. In 
addition, considering the way ecological equivalence and niche-based dynamics are 
intertwined across scales uncovers a tension between top-down (from regional to local) and 
bottom-up (from local to regional) approaches to biodiversity dynamics (Figure 3). To this 
extent, the question of how to handle ecological equivalence connects to Ricklefs' (2008) 
challenge about community ecology. He argued that working at community level is not 
appropriate because it does not take into account the influence of regional dynamics. The way 
niche-based and neutral dynamics drive regional biodiversity in turn influence the dynamics 
of local communities receiving immigrants (Mouquet and Loreau, 2003). In our case, we 
highlight the potential for confusions in any discussion of the status of the neutral theory that 
implicitly focuses on the local scale.  
Furthermore, the question of scale concerns not only community assembly in geographic 
space, but also evolution in multidimensional niche space. Scheffer and van Nes (2006) 
predicted that guilds of equivalent species can evolutionary emerge in distinct regions of 
niche space, as a result of both niche-based and neutral processes. As a consequence, "when 
considering pairs of competitors, or species-poor assemblages, competitive divergence is 
expected, but when considering entire, species-rich communities, convergence among subsets 
of the community can generate sets of nearly competitively equivalent species" (Holt, 2006).  
 
Up to this point we have analyzed differences proper to the explanatory structure of 
neutral theory in ecology: first the explanatory nature and the predictions of neutral models 
vs. niche models, and second the processes yielding ecological equivalence either locally or 
regionally (Figures 2 and 3). The role of equalizing and stabilizing mechanisms is here 
central, and models of ecological equivalence can extend beyond neutral models based on 
individual fitness equivalence (§2.3). In what follows, we discuss the status of neutral theory 
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regarding its role as a possible null hypothesis or a parsimonious baseline for community and 
metacommunity ecology, in such a broad perspective of ecological equivalence. 
 
 
Figure 3. Contrasting representation and hypothesis testing of biodiversity dynamics in a top-down 
framework of niche-based ecological filters from the regional scale (left, adapted from Lortie et al. 
2004), and in a bottom-up framework from individual dynamics to emerging patterns of ecological 
equivalence (right). In both cases, the varying ecological properties of local individuals (different 
symbols in the community ellipse) entail niche differences. On the left, the diversity of the properties 
observed in the community is the result of filtering processes depending on niche differences and 
selection of successful individuals from upper-level pools. On the right, trade-off in niche dimensions 
can result in fitness equalization, or niche differences can overcome the effect of competition to yield 
emergent neutral patterns of community structure (local ecological equivalence). Larger scale 
mechanisms of stabilization (e.g., source-sink metacommunity dynamics) can further generate neutral 
patterns of biodiversity at regional scale, even if niche-based processes predominate in local 
communities (see Figure 2). These contrasting frameworks involve different approaches for 
hypothesis testing. In the top-down framework, the uppest-level pool is given and random 
communities are generated by assuming the absence of filters (pattern-generating null models). In the 
bottom-up framework, mechanistic models of niche-based and neutral dynamics are compared to their 
neutral counterparts without niche difference (nullification), and their predictions are tested at local 
and regional scales. 
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4. Is the neutral theory a null or a parsimonious hypothesis? 
The success of the neutral theory since Hubbell (2001) has primarily relied on its 
heuristic ability to account for some patterns of diversity, even though these patterns had 
been interpreted as niche-driven for decades. Based on the fit of species abundance 
distributions (SAD), some authors compared the predictive ability of neutral vs. niche-based 
models, yielding conflicting results and much debate (Chave et al., 2002; McGill, 2003). A 
critical point is whether such comparison allows concluding in favor of one or the other 
theory. Therefore, much subsequent research turned to define neutral models as a basis for 
hypothesis testing (Bell, 2001; Gotelli and McGill, 2006). Now that we have circumscribed 
the explanatory specificity of neutral theory and of the central equivalence assumption, in a 
scale-dependent framework of equalizing and stabilizing mechanisms, we aim to clarify the 
status of the neutral theory for hypothesis testing after one decade of conflicting views. In this 
regard, we will investigate the meaning of the neutralist claim that neutral models explain 
biodiversity patterns (Bell, 2001; Hubbell, 2001), against the idea that neutral models should 
rather be used as null hypotheses for understanding these patterns (Holyoak et al., 2006; 
McGill et al., 2006a). 
4.1 Conflicting conceptions of the null hypothesis 
Beyond the context of neutral theory, two diverging conceptions exist in ecology on what 
a null hypothesis is:  
 Generation of null patterns. Gotelli and Graves (1996) promoted an instrumentalist 
treatment of the null hypothesis based on pattern-generating null models. These models 
perform "randomization of ecological data or random sampling from a known or specified 
distribution. The null model is designed with respect to some ecological or evolutionary 
process of interest. Certain elements of the data are held constant, and others are allowed 
varying stochastically to create new assemblage patterns. The randomization is designed to 
produce a pattern that would be expected in the absence of a particular ecological 
mechanism" (Gotelli and Graves, 1996). Emphasis is put here on designing a randomization 
procedure that generates a variety of virtual communities complying with a null hypothesis, 
under which some processes are not involved. The alternative hypothesis hence states that 
these neglected processes are actually involved, and the null hypothesis is rejected when the 
observed patterns significantly deviate from the randomized communities, provided that the 
empirical data are relevant enough to allow discernment. This approach is closely related to 
the top-down conception of ecological filters (Figure 3 left), where the constraints represent a 
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regional background context from which we assemble null communities by using a 
randomization scheme. There has been much debate on how to design appropriate null 
models (Gotelli and Entsminger, 2001, 2003; Gotelli and Ulrich, 2012; Ulrich and Gotelli, 
2013). In order to detect the effect of niche-based processes in the alternative hypothesis, 
classical randomization schemes shuffle species biological attributes or community members 
under the null hypothesis that the distribution and abundances of species is independent of 
local environmental conditions and species attributes. A major issue is the nature of the 
processes represented by such randomization scheme: Do randomization procedures comply 
with a specific model of community dynamics? And, if not, should community dynamics be 
simulated directly? 
 Nullification of model parameters. In the second sense, a “null hypothesis” represents 
the influence of a set of processes but nullifies their parameters. To understand this, think of a 
process governed by several parameters, such that the null instance of the process is obtained 
when all the parameters are set to 0. Whether or not setting parameters to 0 in the model 
influences the ability to predict patterns similar to the observed one allows falsifying the null 
hypothesis, based on a statistical criterion of model comparison (Burnham and Anderson, 
2002). Contrarily to the pattern-generation conception, the nullification conception of null 
hypothesis represents explicit community dynamics.  
 
To what extent the neutral theory can be employed as a null hypothesis (Holyoak et al., 
2006; McGill et al., 2006a)? On one hand, the equivalence assumption can be considered of 
the nullification kind, such as the relative fitness parameters wi of all species are set to 0. If 
you consider equation (1), the null hypothesis would be then given by nullification of fitness 
differences only (equalization), which means that the terms from the stabilizing function are 
0: it is the interpretation given by Adler et al. (2007) when they see neutrality as “a special 
case where (...) there are no stabilizing niche-based processes” (quoted above). In this regard, 
the nullification approach resorts to the strong interpretation of the neutral theory. Under this 
interpretation, we see how the neutral model can be a null hypothesis: instantiating the 
random processes that take place when parameters ruling the influence of any biological 
difference are set to 0. In this regard, the main motivation of “nearly neutral models” (Noble 
et al., 2011; Ohta, 1992; Zhou and Zhang, 2008) is to provide an alternative model of fitness 
differences such that individual equivalence is obtained by simply constraining the 
parameters. In addition, because the null hypothesis explicitly considers no influence of 
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biological differences, any ecological equivalence emerging due to stabilizing mechanisms in 
fact pertains to the alternative hypothesis. 
On the other hand, we have underlined that the weak interpretation of neutrality is based 
on emerging neutral patterns, whatever the fine-scale dynamics are. We have integrated in 
this perspective patterns of ecological equivalence emerging at population level in the 
Chesson's framework (§2.3). In any case, emerging ecological equivalence constitutes a null 
hypothesis of the pattern-generation kind, resulting from both neutral and non-neutral 
dynamics through equalization and stabilization. In this conception, “the role of the neutral 
theory is then restricted to providing the appropriate null hypothesis when evaluating 
patterns of abundance and diversity. Even this relatively modest role, however, involves 
revising the comparative approach to ecology“ (Bell, 2001). Holt (2006) concured : “In its 
‘weak’ form, neutral theory at the very least provides the appropriate null model for 
evaluating patterns in comparative data sets”. Since the weak interpretation resorts to neutral 
pattern generation, it implies that the null hypothesis here is not defined by parameter 
nullification. Even so, the weak interpretation still does not comply with a randomization way 
of generating null patterns. Patterns resulting from dispersal and local birth-death dynamics 
are indeed sensibly different from that of shuffled compositions, as Bell (2001) underlined: 
“statistical null hypotheses based on randomization are not appropriate for evaluating 
ecological patterns that stem from species distributions, because local dispersal readily gives 
rise to spatial patterns.“ Therefore, simulation of emerging ecological equivalence should be 
preferred to randomization of community composition. A difficulty of such pattern-
generating model is that it needs estimating the parameters of the dynamics from the data 
(Gotelli and McGill, 2005).  
 
In the perspective of using neutral theory as a null hypothesis, we have related emerging 
ecological equivalence, and thus the weak interpretation of the theory, to the first kind of null 
hypothesis, i.e. pattern-generating, and the strong interpretation of neutral theory, which 
assumes strict equivalence at individual level, to the second kind of null hypothesis, i.e. 
parameter-nullification.  In both cases, a critical issue regards whether a model of neutral 
dynamics provides a well-defined null hypothesis. Specifically, we need to clarify what role 
we would expect for niche differences in the null and alternative hypotheses. Several authors 
have claimed that the hypothetico-deductive approach should begin with the examination of 
some maximally parsimonious model of community dynamics by eliminating non-
explanatory components related to an additional influence of niche differences. Holyoak and 
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Loreau (2006) emphasized that we have the choice “of whether to appeal to parsimony and 
select a neutral community model, or to accept a more complex niche model”. But, as noticed 
above, ecological equivalence can emerge even when niche-based processes influence 
individual dynamics, because of equalizing and stabilizing mechanisms (Figure 2). In this 
regard, emerging ecological equivalence is not a well-specified null hypothesis when the 
alternative hypothesis should identify a role for specified niche dimensions.  
In addition, we have underlined that the predominance of neutral and niche-based 
processes is basically scale-dependent (§3). It is then crucial to keep in mind that null 
hypotheses must be defined in a certain context and at a certain level. Hence, added to the 
alternatives of pattern generation and nullification in hypothesis testing, we have to consider 
the level and scale at which neutrality is envisaged. Conflicting takes on the neutral theory 
then reflect conflicting views on whether a “strong” neutral model would be an explanation 
for patterns extended from individual-level ecological equivalence, or a "weak" model would 
provide an emergent null reference against which to detect a large-scale imprint of niche-
based processes (Araújo and Rozenfeld, 2014). In this regard, aknowledging emerging 
ecological equivalence is required to address the scaling of niche-based processes from the 
scale of individuals bearing distinct biological attributes to larger-scale patterns of 
biodiversity.  
The focus thus shifts from testing the neutral theory against a single niche-based 
alternative, to testing ecological equivalence across scales. In the strong interpretation, a 
hierarchy of alternative hypotheses is needed to address the extent of the influence of 
stabilization and niche differences at multiple scales in space and time. The role of stabilizing 
processes must then be identified in the alternative hypotheses as, for instance, we expect that 
density-dependent effects would generate non-random spatial distributions of conspecific and 
heterospecific individuals (Comita et al., 2010). In the context of the weak interpretation, 
complying with a pattern of neutral dynamics at a given scale entails that niche differences do 
not contribute to explain it: it is a contraposition of the hypothesis that niche differences 
should influence biodiversity patterns, but not a validation of the hypothesis that everything is 
neutral. Therefore, the two approaches are not incompatible, but involve a different 
specification of the null hypothesis. As we will see below, the way the hypotheses are 
specified determines the conclusion to reach from their acceptation or rejection. 
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4.2 Falsification vs. parsimony 
We have seen above that neutral theory can be used as a null reference, but also that the 
nature of the null and alternative hypotheses is scale-dependent and differs between the weak 
and stong interpretations. Yet, apart from these distinctions, a more general methodological 
issue raised by neutral models in ecology is whether we should concentrate on rejecting a null 
neutral hypothesis (falsification), or we could accept it if the predicted patterns are consistent 
with observed ones (parsimony): 
 Falsification. In the hypothetico-deductive approach, the fact that the null hypothesis 
is not falsified does not mean that it is true. As Rosindell et al. (2011: 342) stated, “it does not 
follow that species-specific qualities are absent in the real world; instead, it suggests that their 
effects do not penetrate the foggy lens of the summary statistics being studied. This might 
explain how a neutral model can effectively fit data from a non-neutral world”. Biodiversity 
patterns may not be informative enough to allow discriminating the contributions of neutral 
and non-neutral dynamics, as they could indifferently be generated by a niche-based or by a 
neutral model (Chave et al., 2002; Chisholm and Pacala, 2010; Purves and Pacala, 2005). 
Then using a neutral model as a null hypothesis implies that only rejection of the null 
hypothesis makes sense, that is, we know in this case for sure that something else than this 
neutral model should be proposed for explaining the pattern of interest (McGill et al., 2006a). 
 Parsimony. On the other hand, a central concern in biology is to favor parsimonious 
explanations (the Occam's razor, Sober, 1981). In this regard, if two models can explain a 
given pattern, one should keep the most parsimonious one. A great deal of research in 
ecology is devoted to investigating alternative explanatory models according to a balance 
between their goodness of fit and their complexity (Burnham and Anderson, 2002), given that 
too complex models may pick out too much noise in the data. Then, if both a niche-based and 
a neutral model can explain an observed pattern equally well, the neutral model would be the 
best choice as it provides a more parsimonious explanation (Holyoak and Loreau, 2006). In 
the tradition of macroecology and biogeography, the neutral theory thus provides a most 
simple explanation of large-scale diversity patterns (Bell, 2001).This parsimony criterion has 
led some researchers to conclude that neutral theory predicts robust emerging patterns and is 
a relevant basis to assess the pervasive influence of dispersal limitation at large spatial scales 
(Leigh, 2007). If the neutral theory is a parsimonious hypothesis of biodiversity dynamics, it 
is not to be falsified, it is on the contrary a baseline from which to start.  
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4.3 From parsimony to integration: beyond the niche-neutral divide 
A key argument for using neutral theory as a parsimonious baseline is the generality of 
the basic mechanisms. We have mentioned that dispersal limitation is both a key equalizing 
factor determining the equilibrium composition of neutral communities in the strong sense, 
and a stabilizing factor allowing biodiversity to stay close to neutrality locally and regionally 
despite differences in competitive and dispersal between species. Indeed, no organism can 
disperse instantaneously and homogeneously across a whole region. Holt (2006: 531) thus 
underlined that dispersal limitation is pervasive in communities and may account for most 
neutral dynamics and patterns found in species-rich ecosystems. Stochastic fluctuations of 
birth and death rates are also ubiquitous and influence species populations dynamics because 
of finite-size effects (Lande et al., 2003). Therefore, a reasonable standpoint is that dispersal 
and population sizes of any species are axiomatically limited, so that neutral dynamics should 
be acknowledged everywhere, but still with a varying relative importance compared to niche-
based processes (Gravel et al., 2006; Leibold and McPeek, 2006; Munoz et al., 2014). 
Acknowledging pervasiveness of neutral dynamics ultimately leads to an integrative 
perspective, which forces one to overcome dualities in the interpretation of the neutral model 
as a null hypothesis, and in the acceptation or refutation of the theory. The recognition that 
stochastic processes of birth, death and immigration are ubiquitous and can predominate in 
some contexts has led some authors to plead for a more comprehensive approach, merging 
into one general model the effects of both niche-based and neutral processes (Adler et al., 
2007; Gravel et al., 2006; Holt, 2006; Holyoak and Loreau, 2006; Vellend, 2010). The neutral 
theory then becomes a component of a more general theory. In the logic of model selection 
mentioned above, one can then conclude that niche-based processes contribute to some 
observed pattern if they improve the goodness-of-fit with a limited increase in complexity 
(Burnham and Anderson, 2002). Such an approach aims at disentangling the signatures of 
neutral and niche-based processes from their combined effect (e.g., Adler et al., 2007; 
Doncaster, 2009). 
 
In this perspective, the neutral theory is no more a null hypothesis but a proper 
parsimonious hypothesis for explaining biodiversity. It holds that the mechanisms responsible 
for neutral biodiversity patterns are indeed of the sort Hubbell described, i.e. ecological drift 
etc., and a neutral model is accordingly a reference parsimonious model among a set of more 
complex models further incorporating the effect of niche differences. Along this line, neutral 
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ecology according to Hubbell (2005) did what neutral molecular evolution did regarding 
evolutionary theory (Veuille, 2000): it shifted the burden of proof, to the extent that the 
patterns against which one will check whether selection is acting (e.g. when doing a 
Kreitmann test on genomic sequences) are no longer the expected patterns under selection, 
but the patterns expected under the hypothesis of neutral dynamics alone. Therefore, the roles 
of neutral and of niche-based theories are actually not symmetrical, as neutral theory provides 
a baseline, parsimonious model against which to test more complex theories. Differences 
from the neutral predictions are then not a cause for rejecting a null hypothesis, but rather a 
call for complexifying the model by adding some parameters initially taken as null. 
5. Discussion 
We have identified several fundamental epistemic divides that explain conflicting takes 
on the role and use of neutral theory in ecology. The strong and weak interpretations of 
ecological equivalence differ in the way basic mechanisms or emergent patterns are 
considered, respectively. These interpretations relate to distinct conceptions of ecological 
equivalence as defining a null hypothesis, either as a nullification or a pattern-generating 
hypothesis, respectively. Furthermore, apart from the weak-strong distinction, considering the 
neutral theory as a null reference appeals to question whether the aim is to falsify a neutral 
model, or rather to accept it as a parsimonious explanation when data match the predictions. 
Beyond such dichotomy, we have stressed that the neutral theory is, by essence, a theory of 
pervasive and ubiquitous stochastic dynamics related to limited dispersal and population size. 
From this analysis of the neutral theory, we consider now what is its place in ecological 
research and what are the perspectives opened by this recent paradigm. 
5.1 Situation of the neutral theory in Levins’ triangle 
Wennekes et al. (2012) claimed that the perspectives appropriate to niche and neutral 
theories are different, in the sense Levins (1966) famously distinguished between possible 
model-building strategies based on the fact that a strategy cannot simultaneously fulfill 
generality, precision and realism as distinct epistemic values. Neutral theory would aim for 
generality and niche theory for realism, which means that they provide complementary rather 
than conflicting perspectives. In this viewpoint it is difficult to make sense of the claim that 
neutrality could be a null hypothesis – something Wennekes et al. (2012) acknowledged, 
calling it a 'baseline' model rather than a null model. Hence they see the neutral theory as an 
explanation that philosophically can be seen in an instrumentalist perspective.  
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In the view defended here, it is the very interpretation of ecological equivalence, as well 
as the perspective that the research strategy adopts on it, which determines the status of 
neutral theory. Whereas Wennekes et al. (2012) focused on a global opposition between 
realism and generality, we have insisted on the level- and scale-dependence of neutral and 
niche-based explanations. Understanding the stabilizing mechanisms that yield ecological 
equivalence in a community pertains to realism, whereas taking ecological equivalence as a 
macroscopic emergent property may illuminate the reasons for very general patterns in 
nature. These are two possible positions in the Levins' scheme, but according to the fine-
grained distinctions we have drawn between the strong and weak interpretations, the variety 
of epistemic distinctions between neutral and niche theories may increase. Finally, we have 
highlighted that neutrality can either emerge regionally from stabilizing mechanisms in the 
metacommunity, or locally in the community from equalizing and stabilizing mechanisms 
(Figure 2): hence in order to compare niche and neutral theories, the degree of generality of 
models seems to be less epistemically relevant than the status of scales. 
5.2 Ecological equivalence across scales 
To wrap up the view of the epistemological status of neutral theory and ecological 
equivalence, proposed throughout the paper, let us recall our previous claims. First, there is a 
distinction between ecological equivalence as a cause in the strong interpretation of neutral 
theory, and as an emerging pattern in the weak interpretation (§2). Second, neutral and niche-
based processes are entangled over a hierarchy of spatial and temporal scales, and yield 
emerging equivalence at multiple scales (§3). Third, neutral theory is a theory of ubiquitous 
stochastic dynamics of birth, death, dispersal limitation and regional speciation. This implies 
that neutral theory considers basic components of actual biodiversity dynamics and, as such, 
it is a component of a more integrative theory (§4). From these claims, a major challenge for 
modern ecology is to go beyond the niche and neutral divide, and to consider the nature and 
consequences of ecological equivalence. We should also go beyond the divide of the weak 
and strong interpretations, which should be bypassed by a focus upon integrating ecological 
equivalence in parsimonious models. 
The significance of stabilizing mechanisms leading to emerging ecological equivalence 
depends on the way the influence of individual biological attributes on the one hand, and of 
stochastic dynamics on the other hand, propagates across scales to shape the macroscopic 
patterns. As both an equalizing and stabilizing mechanism, dispersal limitation is a central 
aspect of this multiscale perspective on ecological equivalence. Because most organisms are 
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dispersal-limited, emerging equivalence is expected to be pervasive in ecological systems, 
not only when fitness equivalence occurs in local communities, but also via a combination of 
competition and dispersion leading to larger-scale stabilization, as in the Mouquet and Loreau 
(2003)'s model. In this regard, depending on the role of the stabilizing mechanisms, a neutral 
model based on strict individual ecological equivalence may not provide appropriate 
expectations of the species relative abundances. In contrast, the concept of emerging 
ecological equivalence goes beyond a particular neutral model, and concerns the fact that 
biological attributes do not make a difference in the relative abundances at local and/or 
regional scale. When authors say that there might be several ways towards neutral patterns, 
that in other words one can have neutral patterns with non-neutral processes (e.g., Doncaster, 
2009: 3), they talk about this second version of a neutral model, i.e., more generally, they 
address the status of neutrality as an attractor for many processes taking place at several 
scales in space and time. We must move then from a neutral theory of stochastic individual 
dynamics to a broader theory of ecological equivalence across scales.  
As such, a core aspect of a theory of ecological equivalence is that biological differences 
between species are not explanatory at all: hence we do not have here a causal explanation in 
the sense of difference-making, as emphasized before (§1), and no genuine causal process. 
Then in a perspective of emerging ecological equivalence, differences between species do not 
make a difference, but for a reason other than strict fitness equivalence: here, the differences 
play a role in stabilizing mechanisms so that, at an emergent level, they do no longer make a 
difference. This aspect may be frustrating for ecologists who long aimed at finding causal 
pathways of niche-based dynamics propagating over scales. However, addressing ecological 
equivalence is crucial to understand whether and how biological differences matter to explain 
emergent patterns, because these emergent patterns in turn influence the availability of 
immigrants in regional pools of species (Lessard et al., 2012; Mouquet and Loreau, 2003).  
In such an integrative perspective, neutral theory does not need to be proved or 
disproved. It is a parsimonious baseline model from which to build any refined model of 
biological interactions, in order to understand the nature and extent of equivalence and non-
equivalence in ecological systems. 
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Conclusions 
(1) Characterizing the neutral theory as a null hypothesis (or not) seems too broad a 
characterization to capture what is epistemologically at stake when using neutral models. 
Mechanisms of species coexistence are multiple and nested in spatial scales and in niche 
dimensions, each of them defined by some salient processes, and these scales are at the same 
time decoupled and interacting (Figures 2 and 3). This was captured through the idea that the 
contribution of stabilizing and equalizing mechanisms to neutral patterns of biodiversity 
depends on spatial scale (§3). Here “neutrality” includes many more models than the neutral 
theory sensu Hubbell (2001). In this sense, ecological equivalence is not a null hypothesis on 
the absence of niche-based processes, since it may explicitly refer to an entangled set of 
generating processes, including niche-based ones. 
(2) Therefore, the neutral theory encompasses, as explanatory, the processes that are 
involved in establishing a resulting or emerging ecological equivalence (§1). To this extent it 
is no longer the case that biological differences (between species) make no difference, 
amounting to a non-causal explanation – but these differences result in a pattern of no-
difference that can itself be explanatory of biodiversity. Therefore, we have to acknowledge 
that neutrality is not so neutral since it encompasses more than individual ecological 
equivalence. This extension and at the same time weakening of the original neutral theory 
parallels the fate of the neutral theory in molecular evolution, which gave rise to a more 
explanatory, powerful and encompassing “nearly neutral” theory with relaxed assumptions on 
fitness equality (Ohta, 1992). The controversies and developments that we have reviewed in 
this paper seem to attest that such a move has also occurred in community ecology. 
(3) The necessity of an integrative and multiscale framework of ecological equivalence 
exposes the fact that niche-based processes cannot provide an exclusive causal explanation of 
biodiversity dynamics in space and time. Community ecology has underwent a profound 
paradigm shift with neutral theory, not only by providing a robust theory based on ecological 
equivalence, but also by connecting local ecological dynamics to regional biogeographical 
and evolutionary dynamics. Beyond the neutral-niche divide, a crucial role of a theory of 
ecological equivalence will be to solve the tension between the bottom-up and top-down 
perspectives on this relationship – as they were described in section 3 and illustrated in 
Figure 3 -, and to show how emergent patterns of biodiversity can in turn influence large-
scale biogeographical and evolutionary dynamics. This would make ecological equivalence 
the cornerstone of a comprehensive theory of the emergence and regulation of biodiversity 
29	
dynamics at multiple scales. In this regard, it will no longer be a phenomenological theory of 
emergent patterns, but a theory of the explanatory significance of ecological equivalence.  
(4) Future research should help understand and predict the robustness and resilience of 
biodiversity dynamics in the face of ongoing environmental changes. In this regard, the 
urgent need for predictive ecology requires taking into account the mechanisms coupling 
local and larger-scale biodiversity dynamics (Mouquet et al., 2015). By considering the 
influence of equalizing and stabilizing mechanisms in space and time, multiscale modelling 
of neutral and niche-based dynamics should help forecast the rate and extent of biodiversity 
changes and the possible cascades of environmental alterations.  
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